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Abstract
Following von Wright, “transitions” are needed for understanding agency.
I indicate how von Wright’s account of transitions should be adapted to take
account of objective indeterminism, using the idea of branching space-time.
The essential point is the need to locate transitions not merely in space-time,
but concretely amid the indeterministic, causally structured possibilities of
our (only) world.
 
1 Background: Concrete transitions
The account of action in von Wright 1963 features a well-developed underlying
concept of transition; it teaches us that in order to become clear on actions, it is
essential to become clear on the transitions that conceptually underlie them. The
aim of these remarks is to contribute a little to our understanding of the transitions
that underlie actions by focusing on the family of possible concrete transitions. A
(really) possible concrete transition is distinguished by involving unique, definite,
“pointable” regions in the causal structure of our world—our one and only world
with its own possibilities open toward the future.
2 Generic transitions
I make my target clearer by contrast with the family “generic transitions.” A
generic transition bears the marks of abstractness: A generic transition, like a color,
occurs (or doesn’t) at some position in our world, but not typically at a unique po-
sition; a generic transition can be repeated over and over, and more generally two

This is a “postprint” of Belnap 1999. The page numbers do not, of course, match those of
the original. The idea of a transition is invoked in several publications that appeared after this
one: Belnap, Perloff and Xu 2001 and three essays by the author on branching space-times that
are archived in http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu.
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places where a generic transition happens can have temporal separation, or spatial
separation, or spatio-temporal separation, or indeed respectively be part of individ-
ually possible but jointly impossible courses of events. This last point, the most
difficult, is the one, as we later see, that drives this study.
Von Wright studies generic transitions in von Wright 1963, especially ch. II.
His notation pTq for the transition from generic state of affairs p to generic state
of affairs q highlights an essential feature of generic transitions, that each involves
two states of affairs, the initial state and the end state; and that in any occurrence
of a transition, the initial occurs before the end. A transition is not itself a state of
affairs, but “an ordered pair of two states of affairs,” the “occasion” of the initial of
which must precede the occasion of its end (von Wright 1963, p. 27). Von Wright
labels the state transition itself an “event”—perforce a generic event.
Regrettably but essentially, if we are to locate a generic transition, we must
always mention two occasions, one for the initial state and one for the end state.
In a simple case, however, one can sometimes speak instead of the region between
the initial occasion and the end occasion, and when it makes sense, I will say that
a generic transition occurs across that region.
Von Wright uses the “T” notation to help make it clear to us that “state transi-
tion” does not mean “change of state”: The transition pTp represents an important
type of generic transition, namely, the remaining or unchanging of p, e.g. (Mary is
healthy) T (Mary is healthy), across some occasion.
3 Spatio-temporal locations and individual transitions
There is another contrast to be made. Von Wright identifies “occasions” with
“spatio-temporal locations”; and he says that “occasions are the ‘individualizers’
of generic propositions” (p. 23). Even so, spatio-temporal locations, including re-
gions, are “generic” rather than “concrete” in their own sort of way. Given a spatio-
temporal region, unless determinism be true, there is no (objective) telling which
generic transitions occur across that region. This is clearest with respect to the fu-
ture: Suppose we are doing the Schro¨dinger experiment in a laboratory. Suppose
we stand at the spatio-temporal location, lab/12:00 noon, with a live, caged cat,
and a quantum spin measurement to be made; and suppose further that at lab/1:00
p.m.. the life of the cat depends on whether the measurement outcome is spin-up
or spin-down. What shall we say of “across the lab/noon hour there is a transition
from cat alive to cat dead”? The point is this: Given the spatio-temporal loca-
tion, lab/12:00 noon, there is no determinateness to “cat dead at lab/1:00 p.m.”
It depends, in this case, on the outcome of a piece of indeterminism during the
lab/noon hour, namely, the quantum measurement. Therefore, we cannot indi-
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4. Individuality of transitions 3
vidualize the generic transition, (cat alive) T (cat dead), merely by attaching a
spatio-temporal region: “The dying of the cat across the lab/noon hour” has a ref-
erence in the (objectively) possible case in which the measurement comes spin up,
but no reference in the equally possible spin down case. Whether or not it has a
reference logically depends on an indeterministic measurement, in exact analogy
to the Prior/Thomason history-dependent account of truth.
That was a case of spatio-temporally-determined individuality failing by lack
of the existence clause. For a companion example, take the same circumstances at
lab/12:00 p.m., and consider “across the lab/noon hour there is a transition from
cat’s cage unexamined to cat’s cage examined.” Since this generic transition oc-
curs across the lab/noon hour regardless of spin-up vs. spin-down, there is no
“existence” problem. A uniqueness problem nevertheless remains. Consider “the
examining of the cat’s cage across the lab/noon hour.” The trouble now is that
there are (at least) two of them. There is the examination after the cat dies, and
there is the examination after the cat remains alive. The two examinations obvi-
ously and critically are across the same space-time region, but they have different
causal histories. Merely mentioning a spatio-temporal location does not suffice for
individuation of generic transitions, if indeterminism be true.1
4 Individuality of transitions
It stands the same with von Wright’s example, that Brutus killed Caesar, which
is said to be an “individual proposition” (p. 24). It is quite true, as von Wright
says, that (logically) Caesar can be killed only once. But that only says that in
any single possible course of history, brave Caesar dies but once. That truth does
not comprehend that the generic transition, (Caesar unkilled) T (Caesar killed),
can occur across exactly the same spatio-temporal location in alternate histories
consequent on objectively indeterministic transitions. Look at it this way. In one
case a coward might fear dying several times in the Senate House; that would
exhibit an unrealistic imagination. In another case, a coward might fear dying
more than once across exactly the same space-time region—say Senate House/
Ides of March. The imagination of such a coward would be not only unrealistic but
demented. Consider, however, a third case, a coward who worries about a variety
of violent deaths across Senate House/ Ides of March, each of which separately is
a really, objective possibility (though of course no pair is jointly possible); such a
person is neither demented nor even unrealistic, and although doubtless a coward,
1It is, incidentally, a grave and widespread mistake to try to sort this out with the help of some-
thing like “the actual future,” a Thin Red Line uniquely marked among all the manifold possibilities
that indeterminism requires as objective realities. See Belnap and Green 1994.
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5. Branching space-time 4
might even be taken to be prudent.
One way of putting this conclusion about “many really possible deaths of Cae-
sar across a single region” is that you cannot get rock-bottom concrete individuality
by combining two abstractions. What you will leave out is a unique causal history
and a unique causal future of possibilities. Everyone sees that generic transitions
can be located across two or more spatio-temporally distant regions, and most folks
give lip service to the observation that a given spatio-temporal region can harbor
as possibilities two or more incompatible generic transitions. The further essential
point is that if indeterminism be true, you do not reach specificity by combining
a generic transition with a spatio-temporal location. “(Caesar unkilled)T (Caesar
killed) across the region, Senate House/ Ides of March,” does not describe an in-
dividual (unique) transition, just because the generic transition across that region
(really) could have occurred with different causal relations to the rest of our world.2
None of this makes any difference, of course, if determinism be true. In that
case, there is only one objectively possible course of history; so that the idea of
“alternate courses of history” is only a philosopher’s or logician’s fancy; and the
fashion has been to find theories in various parts of philosophy (ethics, action the-
ory, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, etc. ) that are “compatible” with
determinism. This, I think, has been an unrewarding occupation. Determinism is
false, so that there is no credit in finding a theory compatible with it. Our world
is in fact indeterministic (I say here without argument, but thinking of agency, free
will, radioactivity, quantum measurements, the concept of dread, etc. ), so that the
real and difficult philosophical challenge is to find theories that are compatible
with indeterminism. That is the best sort of “compatibilism.” For example, how
can we rework von Wright’s notion of “occasions”—the putative individualizers of
generic transitions—to be compatible with indeterminism? That is the problem to
which I turn.
5 Branching space-time
The key to a solution is the thought that space-time is not big enough for a serious
theory of alternate possible events such as is required by objective indeterminism.
Space-time is not the right field in which to find “locations” for generic transitions
because space-time location does not locate you amid alternate possibilities. Nor
2Space-time positions must be distinguished from events. Do not confuse the lack of uniqueness
of “the killing of Caesar occurring across space-time region, Senate House/ Ides of March,” with the
unqualified uniqueness of “the killing of Caesar in our past that occurred across the region Senate
House/ Ides of March.” And do not make the Thin Red Line mistake of thinking that one obtains
uniqueness when “future” is substituted for “past.” To do so is a sign of being unwilling to take
objective indeterminism seriously.
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5. Branching space-time 5
is the well-worked theory of “other worlds,” even if supplemented with a space-
time grid common to all “worlds”; for you will lose the objective causal order
between an “occasion” at one time in one world and an “occasion” at another time
in another world. Most seriously, you will lose any causal connection with us.
(Von Wright, happily, does not tend in the direction of other worlds.) Branching
space-time, Belnap 1992, is an effort to describe such a field of “locations.” In that
theory the “locations” are called point events, and every last one of them is in some
form of causal relation to us. These point events are not mere “positions” in space
time, since they are ordered by a causal ordering,   , that simultaneously general-
izes both the causal ordering of Minkowski’s theory, and the causal ordering of the
Prior/Thomason theory of so-called branching time (Prior 1967, Thomason 1970,
Thomason 1984; see also Belnap and Green 1994). For example, the point events
called “space-like related,” while (i) not being directly causally related by   , al-
ways have both (ii) a common lower bound in the causal order, and also (iii) a
common upper bound. Inconsistent point events are two thirds similar: (i) they
are not directly causally related by   , and (ii) they always have a common lower
bound, but (iii) they never have a common upper bound.
If you locate a generic transition between two point events of branching space-
time, you have found true uniqueness, a true individual transition in (not just space-
time but) the causal order. The best indicator of this is that you have fixed its entire
causal past and also its entire causal future of possibilities. Consider an individual,
concrete transition from Caesar unkilled to Caesar killed, that is, an occurrence
of the generic transition, (Caesar unkilled) T (Caesar killed) between two point
events,  and  , of branching space-time, whose space-time locations bound the
space-time region, Senate House/Ides of March. Then this individualized transition
has a unique causal past—the past of  , not shared by any other such transition.
Given the individual transition, its entire past—what did happen—is a “fact.”
The story is more complicated for the future, and much less well understood
in our shallow “compatibilist” times. It requires the essential idea of a “history,”
which, although rigorously definable in terms of just “   ,” should be understood
intuitively (and roughly) as a total consistent collection of point events that shares
with us some definite point event in our own past. The theory of branching space-
time says that given the individualized, concrete occurrence of Caesar’s being
killed that lies in our own past, it makes sense to go further back, still in our own
(actual) past, perhaps before the region, Senate House/Ides of March, and ask if
there are real indeterministic choice points that could also have issued in Caesar’s
being killed, and being killed across that very same spatio-temporal region, Sen-
ate House/Ides of March—but in a different causal matrix.3 If determinism be
3I fear to give examples, because the question does not have to do with interestingly different
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6. Possible concrete transitions 6
true, there are no such choice points in our past. If there are such choice points,
however, then, as a conceptual obligation, we should—rather than easing our con-
science with compatibilist waffle and fudge—accept the reality of these alternate
concrete possibilities. “Space-time is not enough.”
6 Possible concrete transitions
Branching space-time provides a helpful and rigorous theory of point events as
causally ordered by   . In this theory we can give a satisfying, airtight account of
possible concrete transitions.4 To do so smoothly, I have to change jargon a little
from von Wright. I need a word for an arbitrary nonempty set of point events,
and for this I say just event. (The change in jargon is not intended to minimize
von Wright’s point that common-sense “events” should frequently be identified
with transitions (p. 28), which is surely both correct and extremely important.)
An initial event (adopting word and adapting idea from von Wright, p. 28) is any
event that is upper bounded in branching space-time. Each initial event can pass
away; there is always a possible concrete point event at which we can truly say
“that’s over.” An outcome event (changing word while adapting idea from ibid.)
is any event that is lower bounded. Each outcome event can come to be; there is
always a possible concrete point event at which we can truly say “that hasn’t yet
come to be, but it might.” Notice the difference between the structures of initials
and outcomes of a transition; this difference is essential for a constructive general
theory of outcomes as in Belnap 1996.
A (possible concrete) transition is now well-defined as an ordered pair (this
much follows von Wright) of events (but “events” in the jargon sense of branching
space-time),   ,  where  is an initial event, and  is an outcome event, and
such that every member of the initial,

, is (not just in the “temporal” past but) in
the causal past of every member of the outcome,  .5
Now a key definition, relying on the concept of history. A transition
 
,  is
contingent if the passing away of its initial,

, does not guarantee the coming to
be of its outcome,  . That is, it is contingent if there is a history that totally con-
tains

and totally excludes  . This notion of contingency is absolutely objective
alternate killings, nor with choice points that seem to us relevant. The question is about objective
indeterminism, not about what we think important.
4Does the phrase “possible concrete . . .” make you nervous? Probably. Certainly the determinists
and many compatibilists automatically think that possibilities are, as a matter of logic, abstract, or
perhaps tied somehow to our language or imagination or even logic. This is, however, bad logic, on
a footing with the faulty logic involved in the improperly-named false doctrine of “logical determin-
ism.”
5See Szabo and Belnap 1996 for more details, and an application to quantum weirdness.
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6. Possible concrete transitions 7
and absolutely fundamental. It has nothing to do with laws or languages or logic
or physics or nature or culture or other worlds, such as “compatibilist” programs
suggest. It is based entirely upon the causal ur-structure of our world (and of no
“other” world), a structure that is the common ground of natural process and of
human action. It is rooted in reality. The theory of agency cannot flourish without
such a notion.
Here are two brief examples.
Here we are, having seen a living cat. We are at lab/1:00 p.m., but although
unique in the “space-time” grid, these words do not pick out a unique place in
the causal order. Let us just call where we are here/now, and let us suppose, for
expository convenience, a frame of reference in which to keep time. What of the
transition from the initial point event here/(one hour ago) to the outcome point
event, here/now, keeping the supposition that the quantum measurement was set to
go (but had not yet occurred) at here/(one hour ago)? We have a contingent transi-
tion (if quantum theory be true), since one of the possible histories that continues
here/(one hour ago) excludes a living cat, and so excludes the concrete point event,
here/now.
What if we keep here/now as outcome, but consider the initial event here/(one
second ago). Then to believe that this transition is not contingent is to believe that
the happening of here/(one second ago) guarantees the happening of here/now, in
the usual sense that every history containing here/(one second ago) also contains
here/now. Is the belief true? Who today knows the answer to this entirely objective
question? Certainly no philosopher.
The single most fundamental transitions in branching space time seem to be
the “immediate” transitions, in which there is no room at all between initial and
outcome. And of these, the ones that have spawned the most interesting theory to
date are transitions whose initials are point events. Thus, an immediate transition
is always from a point event as initial to a set of point events as outcome, where the
initial point event is a proper greatest lower bound of the outcome event. Suppose
such a transition is contingent. Then the initial will be a “last moment of indeter-
mination,” while in general there will be no “first moment of determination”—like
a species of Dedekind cut. We call any initial of a contingent immediate transition
a choice point. It is “where the action happens,” whether it be a moment of choice
of a person or a metaphorical moment of choice in a quantum measurement. It is a
point event at which past history divides—right there—into more than one possi-
ble future history. I firmly believe that it is impossible to have a satisfactory theory
of any of objective indeterminism, objective causality, or objectively free action,
without studying contingent immediate transitions, or something very much like
them. If the theory of branching space-time be true, they serve as “originating
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causes.”6
7 Propositional transitions
What about generic concepts involving “propositions”? Branching space-time
gives help here. We adapt a standard jargon by defining a proposition as a set
of histories. Given a possible concrete transition, there is a “propositional” tran-
sition of some interest. There is the set of all histories in which the initial comes
to a close; these histories all contain the initial. There is the set of all histories in
which the outcome begins to be; these histories all overlap the outcome. Then the
first proposition, call it p, “says” that the initial passes away, and the second, call it
q, “says” that the outcome begins to be. So there is excellent sense in saying that
there is a transition from p to q. The contingency of the transition can be marked
by saying that q is a proper subset of p—some histories are dropped in passing
from the initial to the outcome.
Propositions as sets of histories will not do, however, for generic transitions
in the sense of von Wright, since central examples such as pTp and pT   p obvi-
ously require us to evaluate the same proposition, e.g. p, on different occasions
(von Wright 1963 p. 23) in the same history. Instructed by the work of Prior and
Thomason (op. cit. ), we know what is wanted for indeterminism, namely, the sort
of proposition that can be said to be true (not just in a history but) in a history
at a point event.7 Such propositions are represented by sets of (not histories but)
ordered pairs
 
 ,

 , where  is a point event and  is a history, and where  in fact
belongs to  . Of course such a proposition is “true in  at  ” iff the pair
 
 ,


belongs to p; and we also say that “p is settled true [false] at  ” iff    ,   is in [not
in] p for every history to which  belongs.
The whole story of generic transitions involving such propositions must be
complicated, and so like von Wright (1963, p. 28), we begin with the simplest
case: (i) The initial and outcome propositions are both to be state-like, where a
proposition, p, is state-like iff for each point event,  , p is either settled true or
settled false at  and (ii) the initial  and the outcome  of the concrete transition
 
,  are both single point events:

=   and  =   . Our question is,
then, when does generic pTq occur at the concrete point-to-point transition
 
 	 ,
   ? The only possible answer—and the one that follows von Wright—seems
6If this is correct, then, using “event” in the branching-space-times sense, originating causes are
certain ordered pairs of events (transitions), rather than events. This is confusing, and so it is good
to remark that originating causes are “events” in von Wright’s sense that identifies an event with a
transition.
7This scheme sounds like the “true at a time in a world” scheme; but, as you may infer from our
earlier discussion, the causal ordering, 
 , in fact makes a profound difference.
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7. Propositional transitions 9
this: pTq occurs there just in case (i) p is settled true at   , and (ii) q is settled true
at  . Thus, for example, pTp occurs at the concrete transition,
 
   ,    , just
in case p is settled true at  and p is also settled true at   .
The account of the logic of pTq beginning on p. 27, including the surprising
reduction on p. 31, exactly fits this case. Naturally, as von Wright in effect notes
on p. 28, that will no longer be true, when we pass to more complicated sorts of
generic transitions pTq, or to more complicated concrete transitions from initial

to outcome  . And we must go on to these cases if we wish to justice to agency;
even the very simple form of “sees to it that” agentive transition studied in the
‘dstit’ theory of Horty and Belnap 1995 does not have this “point event to point
event” structure.
The concrete transitions underlying dstit are not point-to-point at all, but es-
sentially both continuous and immediate; they are and must be of the form
 
, 
where

consists of a single point  , while  typically descends infinitely toward
  . When does a generic transition, pTq, occur at
 
   ,  ? For dstit theory, and
I should think for many purposes, we shall need (i) for the initial, that p is settled
true at  , and (ii) for the outcome, that for every history overlapping  , q is true
throughout some (perhaps very small) beginning portion of  . For example, pic-
ture a billiard player with cue in hand, and let p be “the cue ball is motionless.”
Then pT   p occurs at
 
,  when  is the point event of impact, and represents a
standard continuous transition from rest to motion. Provided motion in our world
is continuous, however,   pTp can never occur at an immediate transition
 
   ,
 ; for any such occurrence would be a discontinuous transition from motion to
rest.
To see that the von Wright reduction does not always apply to these immediate
transitions, however, we need a different example. Let the general situation be the
same, but add that the cue ball is motionless at   . Now let p be “the velocity of the
cue ball exceeds more than one inch per second toward the nine ball.” The problem
is that given
 
  ,  immediate, none of the following four generic transitions
will occur there: pTp, pT   p,   pTp,   pT   p. The first two fail because the cue ball
is at rest, and the second two fail because you cannot—if motion be continuous—
have an immediate transition from rest to a velocity of more than one inch per
second. The elegant von Wright reduction depends on at least one of these T-
formulas occurring, as is importantly true for the point-to-point transitions that von
Wright considers; but the example shows that the reduction does not and should
not hold for the immediate transitions—the “originating causes”—that underlie the
dstit theory of action; nor has von Wright implied otherwise.
What does remain true, I think, is the eventual capacity of branching space-time
to illuminate much more complicated cases of concrete transitions. The “theory of
outcomes” of Belnap 1995 investigates many of these in a simplified setting, but
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7. Propositional transitions 10
still includes cases in which initials and outcomes are complex in various important
ways. Nevertheless, to my mind we are not yet close to possessing a conceptual
structure that can give us a nice, warm feeling about our understandings of initials,
outcomes, transitions, causality, causal independence, “strange correlations,” etc.
. . ., all of which are preliminary to an appreciation of how agency fits into the causal
structure of our world. I believe part of the blame must be put on the regrettable
conscience-easing aspect of our philosophical culture that delights in finding ways
to avoid the conceptual problems concerning concrete, objectively possible events
in a seriously indeterministic world.
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